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Libby v. Eight Judicial District Court, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 39 (May 29, 2014)1 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
 
Summary 
  
The Court determined two issues: (1) when NRS 41A.097(2)’s three-year medical 
malpractice statute of limitation period commences; and (2) whether the time to file the 
complaint was properly tolled in accordance with NRS 41A.097(3). 
 
Disposition 
 
 The Court concluded that NRS 41A.097(2)’s three-year limitation period begins 
to run when a plaintiff suffers appreciable harm, regardless of whether the plaintiff is 
aware of the injury’s cause. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Petitioner, Eugene P. Libby, D.O. is an orthopedic surgeon who performed 
emergency surgery on Megan Hamilton’s left knee on November 8, 2005. At the follow 
up appointment on November 28, 2005, Ms. Hamilton complained of pain in her knee 
that started one week earlier. At that time, Dr. Libby took an aspirated culture of Ms. 
Hamilton’s knee. The results of the culture tested positive for a bacterium known as 
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureas (MRSA).  
 On May 16, 2006, in an effort to fight the MRSA infection, Dr. Libby performed 
another surgery on Ms. Hamilton’s knee to remove surgical screws and washers, which 
were blocking the antibiotics from killing the infection. The MRSA infection persisted 
and on August 21, 2006, Dr. Libby lanced Ms. Hamilton’s knee and removed a yellowish 
substance. That was the last procedure performed by Dr. Libby. 
 Subsequently, Ms. Hamilton had two additional surgeries on her knee performed 
by different doctors. The first surgery took place on December 15, 2006 and the second 
on April 15, 2009. Both surgeries removed sutures, which tested positive for MRSA. It 
was then determined that these sutures were the cause of Ms. Hamilton’s injury. 
 Ms. Hamilton filed her complaint against Dr. Libby on April 14, 2010. Dr. Libby 
filed a motion for summary judgment based on the fact that more than three years had 
passed between the end of Dr. Libby’s treatment and the filing of the complaint. 
Therefore, Ms. Hamilton’s claims were time-barred by NRS 41A.097(2). The district 
court denied Dr. Libby’s motion for summary judgment. As a result, Dr. Libby filed a 
writ of mandamus with the Nevada Supreme Court. 
 
Discussion 
 
Standard of Review 
 The Court first noted that it is within its discretion to consider a writ of 
mandamus.2 The Court utilized its’ discretion since the writ petition posed an issue of 
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first impression for the Court regarding the three-year limitation period contained in NRS 
41A.097(2) begins to run. Moreover, the Court elected to exercise its discretion because 
the Nevada district courts have inconsistently applied the statute and the Court wanted to 
clarify this question of law.3 The Court reviewed this question of law de novo.4 
 
NRS 41A.097(2)’s three-year limitation period begins to run once the plaintiff suffers 
appreciable harm 
 NRS 41A.097(2) provides that “an action for injury . . . against a provider of 
health care may not be commenced more than 3 years after the date of injury or 1 year 
after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever occurs first . . .”5 
 To determine which event to look at as the catalytic event by which the three-year 
statute of limitations begins to run, the Court looked at other cases where it interpreted 
this statute’s one-year limitation period.6 First, the Court in Massey explained that NRS 
41A.097(2)’s one-year limitation period begins to run when a plaintiff “knows, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts that would put a 
reasonable person on inquiry of notice of his case of action.”7 Furthermore, the term 
“injury” encompasses a plaintiff’s discovery of damages as well as discovery of the 
negligent cause of the damages.8 Subsequently, in Winn, the Court recognized that NRS 
41A.097(2) requires a plaintiff to satisfy both the one-year discovery rule and the three-
year limitation period.9 Thus, the commencement of a malpractice action is bound by two 
time frames, which are tied to two different events. Moreover, in Massey and Winn the 
Court noted that the Plaintiff must be aware of the cause of his or her injury when 
applying NRS 41.097(2)’s one-year limitation period. In the present case, the Court 
declined to extend that theory to NRS 41.097(2)’s three-year limitation period as it would 
cause it to become irrelevant.10 
 Next, the Court turned to California for guidance on this issue since California’s 
medical malpractice statute of limitations is identical to Nevada’s statute.11  California 
courts have also concluded that a plaintiff need not be aware of the cause of his or her 
injury for the three-year limitation period to begin to accrue.12  Moreover, California 
courts, including the California Court of Appeal, have recognized that a plaintiff must 
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suffer an appreciable harm in order for the three-year limitation period to commence.13 
The Court specifically analyzed the California Court of Appeal’s case, Garbert v. 
Superior Court.14 There, the plaintiff failed to file a claim for medical malpractice for 
more than six years after the surgery was performed. The California Court of Appeal 
reasoned that the plaintiff’s claim was barred because the three-year statute of limitations 
began to run “once there [was] a manifestation of the injury in some significant way.”15 
 Subsequently, the Court adopted the reasoning of the California courts and 
concluded “that the Nevada Legislature tied the running of the three-year limitation 
period to the plaintiff’s appreciable injury and not to the plaintiff’s awareness of that 
injury’s possible cause.” Applying this interpretation of NRS 41.097(2) to the present 
case, the Court held that the three-year statute of limitations for Ms. Hamilton’s claim 
against Dr. Libby began to run in August of 2006 when the tests showed that the MRSA 
infection continued to persist despite the May 2006 surgical intervention. The persistence 
of the infection was an appreciable and significant manifestation of Ms. Hamilton’s 
injury despite the fact that Ms. Hamilton was still unaware of the cause of the continued 
MRSA infection. 
 Since Ms. Hamilton’s complaint was filed on April 14, 2010, more than three 
years from the established date of injury, the district court erred when it denied Dr. 
Libby’s motion for summary judgment. No genuine issues of material fact remain 
because MS. Hamilton’s claims are barred by NRS 41A.097(2)’s commencement 
limitations.16 
 
NRS 41A.097(3) did not toll the time for Ms. Hamilton to file her complaint 
 Next the Court disposed of Ms. Hamilton’s second argument. Ms. Hamilton 
argued that even if her claim is barred by NRS 41A.097(2)’s three-year statute of 
limitations, the time to bring her claim was tolled under NRS 41A.097(3) based on Dr. 
Libby’s concealment of the suture material remaining in her knee after the May 2006 
surgery.  
 NRS 41A.097(3) provides that the limitation period to bring a claim against a 
health care provider is “tolled for any period during which the provider of health care has 
concealed any act, error or omission upon which the action is based and which is known 
to the provider of health care.”17 However, this tolling provision only applies when there 
is an intentional act that objectively hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from timely 
filing suit.18 Seeing as Ms. Hamilton failed to provide any evidence of an intentional act 
on the part of Dr. Libby, the Court that there was no genuine issues of material fact 
remaining as to NRS 41A.097(3)’s tolling provision. 
 Finally, the Court disposed of Ms. Hamilton’s last argument. Ms. Hamilton 
argued that since NRS 41A.097 was modeled after California’s medical malpractice 
statute of limitations, the foreign-body tolling rule in California’s statute should be 
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applied to NRS 41A.097. The Court declined to expand NRS 41A.097 because “the 
Nevada Legislature has not codified a tolling provision similar to the “foreign body” 
exception in California’s statute…and [the Court] cannot read the language from 
California’s foreign-body tolling rule into NRS 41A.097”  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Applying NRS 41A.097(2) to the present case, the Court concluded that Ms. 
Hamilton’s claims were time-barred because the complaint was filed more than three 
years from the date when tests showed that the MRSA infection persisted despite the 
surgical intervention. Therefore, the Court instructed the clerk to issue a writ of 
mandamus directing the district court to grant Dr. Libby’s motion for summary judgment. 
 
 
